Procedures are described for the representation of results in analyses that involve both aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty, with aleatory uncertainty deriving from an inherent randomness in the behaviour of the system under study and epistemic uncertainty deriving from a lack of knowledge about the appropriate values to use for quantities that are assumed to have fixed but poorly known values in the context of a specific study. Aleatory uncertainty is usually represented with probability and leads to cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) or complementary CDFs (CCDFs) for analysis results of interest. Several mathematical structures are available for the representation of epistemic uncertainty, including interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory. In the presence of epistemic uncertainty, there is not a single CDF or CCDF for a given analysis result. Rather, there is a family of CDFs and a corresponding family of CCDFs that derive from epistemic uncertainty and have an uncertainty structure that derives from the particular uncertainty structure (e.g. interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory or probability theory) used to represent epistemic uncertainty. Graphical formats for the representation of epistemic uncertainty in families of CDFs and CCDFs are investigated and presented for the indicated characterisations of epistemic uncertainty.
Introduction
The appropriate treatment of uncertainty in analyses of complex systems is a topic of great importance and hence of widespread interest (Rowe 1994 , Draper 1995 , Helton and Burmaster 1996 , Laskey 1996 , Matthies et al. 1997 , Glimm and Sharp 1998 , 1999 , Casman et al. 1999 , Bankes 2002 , Devolder et al. 2002 , Oberkampf et al. 2002 , Van Asselt and Rotmans 2002 , Wagner 2003 , Christie et al. 2005 . Such treatment is particularly important in computational analyses that are used to support important societal decisions on issues related to climate change (Allen et al. 2000 , Katz 2002 , Vaughan and Spouge 2002 , Webster et al. 2002 , Patt et al. 2005 , reactor safety (Breeding et al. 1992 , Helton and Breeding 1993 , Khatib-Rahbar et al. 1996 , Cheok et al. 1998 , Nutt and Wallis 2004 , Ahn et al. 2006 , Reinert and Apostolakis 2006 , radioactive waste disposal (Helton and Marietta 2000 , Stepp et al. 2001 , Mohanty and Sagar 2002 , Saltelli and Tarantola 2002 , Long and Ewing 2004 , Mohanty and Codell 2004 , Moeller and Ryan 2005 , Ghosh and Apostolakis 2006 , nuclear weapon safety (D'Antonio 1998 , Demmie 1998 , Sharp and Wood-Schultz 2003 , Helton et al. 2006a , economic policy (Agro et al. 1997 , Briggs 2000 , Kann and Weyant 2000 , Borgonovo and Peccati 2006 , Webster and Cho 2006 , environmental degradation (Bates et al. 2003 , Singh et al. 2003 , Babendreier and Castleton 2005 , Li and Wu 2006 ) and many additional areas of concern and challenge. Indeed, it is difficult to envision how adequately informed decisions can be made on such issues without an appropriate assessment of the uncertainties present in the supporting analyses.
An immediate challenge in the development of an appropriate treatment of uncertainty in an analysis of a complex system is the selection of a mathematical structure to be used in the representation of uncertainty. Traditionally, probability theory has provided this structure (Fine 1973 , Hacking 1975 , Parry and Winter 1981 , Weatherford 1982 , Stigler 1986 , Apostolakis 1990 , Howson and Urbach 1993 , Hacking 2001 . However, in the last several decades, additional mathematical structures for the representation of uncertainty such as evidence theory (Dempster 1967a ,b, 1968 , Shafer 1976 , Wasserman 1988 , Wasserman 1990 , Guan and Bell 1991 , Halpern and Fagin 1992 , possibility theory (Zadeh 1978 , Dubois and Prade 1988 , DeCooman et al. 1995 , DeCooman 1997 , Dubois 2006 , fuzzy set theory (Zadeh 1965 , Dubois and Prade 1980 , Bardossy and Duckstein 1995 , Ross et al. 2002 , Ross 2004 ) and interval analysis (Moore 1966 , 1979 , Neumaier 1990 , Hammer et al. 1993 , Kearfott and Kreinovich 1996 , Jaulin et al. 2001 have been introduced. This introduction has been accompanied by a lively discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the various mathematical structures for the representation of uncertainty (Lindley 1982 , 1987 , Cheeseman 1988 , Klir 1989 , Kosko 1990 , Laviolette and Seaman 1992 , Laviolette et al. 1995 , Ferson and Ginzburg 1996 . For perspective, several comparative discussions of these different approaches to the representation of uncertainty are available (Dubois and Prade 1989 , Wu et al. 1990 , Smets 1998 , Dubois et al. 2000 , Klir 2000 , Ross et al. 2002 , Bardossy and Fodor 2004 , Helton et al. 2004 , Baudrit and Dubois 2006 ).
An additional and closely related challenge derives from the presence of two different types of uncertainty in most analyses for complex systems. The first type derives from an inherent randomness in the behaviour of the system under study. For example, the weather conditions at the time of a major accident at a chemical plant could have a significant effect on the number of resultant off-site injuries, but is essentially random in so far as our ability to predict the future is concerned. Uncertainty of this type is usually referred to as aleatory uncertainty; alternative designators include variability, stochastic, irreducible and Type A (Parry and Winter 1981 , Helton 1994 , Hoffman and Hammonds 1994 , Helton and Burmaster 1996 , Paté-Cornell 1996 , Winkler 1996 , Cullen 1999 , Kelly and Campbell 2000 . The second type of uncertainty derives from a lack of knowledge about a quantity that is assumed to have a fixed, but poorly known, value in the context of a particular analysis. For example, the appropriate value to use for a spatially averaged permeability in an analysis involving groundwater flow has, by definition, a single value but this single 'effective' value can never be known with certainty. Uncertainty of this type is usually referred to as epistemic uncertainty; alternative designators include state of knowledge, subjective, reducible and Type B (Parry and Winter 1981 , Helton 1994 , Hoffman and Hammonds 1994 , Helton and Burmaster 1996 , Paté-Cornell 1996 , Winkler 1996 , Cullen 1999 , Kelly and Campbell 2000 .
The challenges associated with the treatment of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in the analysis of a complex system are twofold. First, it is necessary to select and then implement a mathematical structure to represent each of these uncertainties. The mathematical structures used to represent aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in a particular analysis are not necessarily the same. For example, probability theory could be, as is usually the case, used to represent aleatory uncertainty while, in the same analysis, evidence theory is used to represent epistemic uncertainty. Second, the mathematical structures used to represent aleatory and epistemic uncertainty must be propagated through the analysis in a manner that maintains an appropriate separation of these uncertainties in the final results of interest.
The purpose of this presentation is to discuss and illustrate the representation of analysis results involving aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. To this end, several mathematical structures for the representation of uncertainty are described (Section 2); the distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty is discussed (Section 3); a simple example involving the reliability of a coastal dike is introduced for use in illustrating the representation of uncertainty (Section 4); the representation of unstructured epistemic uncertainty is discussed and illustrated (Section 5); and the representation of structured epistemic uncertainty is discussed and illustrated (Section 6). The presentation then ends with a concluding discussion (Section 7).
Representation of uncertainty
This section provides a brief overview of the following mathematical structures that are used in the representation of uncertainty: interval analysis (Section 2.1); possibility theory (Section 2.2); evidence theory (Section 2.3); and probability theory (Section 2.4). For each structure, the following topics are considered: (i) the representation of uncertainty in a single variable x i ; (ii) the representation of uncertainty in a vector x ¼ ½x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x nX , of uncertain variables; and (iii) the representation of the uncertainty in a variable y defined by y ¼ FðxÞ; x ¼ ½x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x nX ; ð2:1Þ
where F is a function of vector x of uncertain variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x nX . Although other possibilities exist, the results in this presentation are motivated by analysis contexts in which (i) each variable x i has potential values contained in a real-valued interval and (ii) the analysis outcome y also has potential values contained in a real-valued interval. For this overview, no distinction is made between aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty. Then, the section concludes with a discussion of the use of sampling-based (i.e. Monte Carlo) procedures in the propagation of different mathematical structures for the representation of uncertainty (Section 2.5).
Interval analysis
Interval analysis is based on the assumption that a set X i of possible values for a variable x i is known but with no specified uncertainty structure within the set X i (Moore 1966 , 1979 , Neumaier 1990 , Hammer et al. 1993 , Kearfott and Kreinovich 1996 , Jaulin et al. 2001 . Thus, all that is assumed to be known about x i is that its value is contained within the set X i . Usually, but not necessarily, X i is defined by
where [a i , b i ] is an interval that contains the possible values for x i .
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For a vector x ¼ ½x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x nX of variables known only to be contained in the sets X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X nX , the set X of possible values for x is given by
Given that there is no specified uncertainty structure for the sets X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X nX , there is also no uncertainty structure for the set X of possible values for x. Furthermore, the preceding representation for X is predicated on the assumption that no restrictions exist that preclude specific combinations of values for the individual variables contained in x. Propagation of the individual values of x contained in X through the function F results in the set
of possible values for y. Given that there is no uncertainty structure for the set X, there is also no uncertainty structure for the set Y.
In most applications, the indicated propagation to produce the set Y is based on using algebraic procedures implemented with appropriate software. However, an interval analysis can also be thought of as an optimisation process in which it is desired to find the minimum and maximum of the function F on the set X. Alternatively, the uncertainty propagation associated with an interval analysis can be approximated with a samplingbased (i.e. Monte Carlo) procedure.
Possibility theory
Possibility theory (Zadeh 1978 , Dubois and Prade 1988 , DeCooman et al. 1995 , DeCooman 1997 , Dubois 2006 ) provides a representation for uncertainty that permits the specification of more structure than interval analysis and is based on the specification of a pair (X i , r i ) for a variable x i , where (i) X i is the set of possible values for x i and (ii) r i is a function defined on X i such that 0 # r i ðx i Þ # 1 for x i [ X i and sup{rðx i Þ : x i [ X i } ¼ 1. The function r i provides a measure of the amount of 'credence' or 'confidence' that is assigned to each element of X i and is referred to as the possibility distribution function for x i . The pair (X i , r i ) defines a possibility space for the variable x i .
A value of r(x i ) ¼ 1 indicates that there is no known information that refutes the 'occurrence' or 'appropriateness' of a specific value x i contained in X i , and a value of r(x i ) ¼ 0 indicates that known information completely refutes the 'occurrence' or 'appropriateness' of x i . Further, increasing values for r(x i ) between 0 and 1 indicate an increasing absence of information that refutes the 'occurrence' or 'appropriateness' of x i . Intuitively, r(x i ) ¼ 1 signifies that x i is entirely possible in the sense that nothing is known that contradicts the possibility of x i ; 0 , rðx i Þ , 1 signifies that x i is possible but with the amount of information indicating that x i is not possible increasing as r(x i ) approaches 0; and r(x i ) ¼ 0 signifies that x i is known to be impossible. Alternatively, the pair (X i , r i ) can be thought of as defining a fuzzy set with r(x i ) corresponding to x i 's level of membership in X i (Zadeh 1978) .
Possibility theory provides two measures of likelihood for subsets of X i : possibility and necessity. Specifically, possibility and necessity for a subset U of X i are defined by
and
respectively. In consistency with the properties of the possibility distribution function r i , Pos i (U) provides a measure of the amount of information that does not refute the proposition that U contains the appropriate value for x i , and Nec i (U) provides a measure of the amount of uncontradicted information that supports the proposition that U contains the appropriate value for x i . Relationships satisfied by possibility and necessity for the possibility space (X i , r i ) include for subsets U of X i (see Klir and Wierman 1999) . Convenient graphical summaries of possibility spaces are provided by cumulative necessity functions (CNFs), complementary CNFs (CCNFs), cumulative possibility functions (CPoFs) and complementary CPoFs (CCPoFs). Specifically, the CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF for the possibility space (X i , r i ) are defined by the sets
and notation of the form [, , , ] denotes a vector (i.e. an ordered pair). Plots of the curves defined by the points associated with CNF i , CCNF i , CPoF i and CCPoF i yield the CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF for the possibility space (X i , r i ) ( Figure 1 ). If the variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x nX have associated possibility spaces (X 1 , r 1 ), (X 2 , r 2 ), . . . , (X nX , r nX ), then the vector x ¼ [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x nX ] also has an associated possibility space (X, r X ), where X is defined the same as in Equation (2.3) and r X ðxÞ ¼ min{r 1 ðx 1 Þ; r 2 ðx 2 Þ; . . . ; r nX ðx nX Þ}: ð2:13Þ
The indicated definitions for X and r X are predicated on the assumption that no restrictions involving possible combinations of values for the x i 's exist. If such restrictions exist, then the definition of r X is more complex. Once the possibility space (X, r X ) for x is defined, possibility Pos X (U) and necessity Nec X (U) for subsets U of X are defined as indicated in Equations (2.5) and (2.6). Further, the relationships indicated in Equations (2.7) -(2.10) also hold.
Propagation of the individual values of x contained in X through the function F indicated in Equation (2.1) results in a set Y of possible values for y of the form shown in Equation (2.4). Given that a possibility space (X, r X ) exists for x, a resultant possibility space (Y, r Y ) also exists for the values of y. Specifically, the possibility distribution function r Y is defined by
In turn, the possibility Pos Y (U) and necessity Nec Y (U) for subsets U of Y can be defined as indicated in Equations (2.5) and (2.6); further, the relationships indicated in Equations (2.7) -(2.10) also hold. Provided y is real valued, the possibility space (Y, r Y ) can be summarised by presentation of the corresponding CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF as discussed in conjunction with Equations (2.11) and (2.12). Specifically, the CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF for y are defined by the sets
Plots of the curves defined by CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF produce a figure identical in concept to Figure 1 and provide a visual representation of the uncertainty associated with y in terms of necessity and possibility. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and (iv) 
Evidence theory
Evidence theory, which is also known as Dempster-Shafer theory in recognition of the initial work done by these two individuals, provides a representation for uncertainty that permits the specification of more structure than possibility theory (Dempster 1967a ,b, 1968 , Shafer 1976 , Wasserman 1988 , Guan and Bell 1991 , Halpern and Fagin 1992 . Evidence theory is based on the specification of a triple (X i , X i , m i ) for a variable x i , where (i) X i is the set of possible values for x i , (ii) X i is a countable collection of subsets of
In the terminology of evidence theory, (i) X i is the sample space or universal set, (ii) X i is the set of focal elements for X i and m i and (iii) m i (U) is the basic probability assignment associated with a subset U of X i . In concept, the basic probability assignment m i (U) provides a measure of the amount of information (or credibility or probability) that can be associated with a subset U of X i but which cannot be further decomposed over subsets of U.
Evidence theory provides two measures of likelihood for subsets of X i : plausibility and belief. Specifically, the plausibility and belief for a subset U of X i are defined by respectively. As a result of the intersection requirement (i.e. V > U -B in Equation (2.20)), Pl i (U) provides a measure of the amount of information that could possibly be associated with U. Similarly, as a result of the subset requirement (i.e. V , U in Equation (2.21)), Bel i (U) provides a measure of the amount of information that is known to be associated with U. When the focal elements in X i are nested, the evidence space (
Relationships satisfied by plausibility and belief for the evidence space ( for subsets U of X i . Convenient graphical summaries of evidence spaces are provided by cumulative belief functions (CBFs), complementary CBFs (CCBFs), cumulative plausibility functions (CPFs) and complementary CPFs (CCPFs). Specifically, the CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF for the evidence space (X i , X i , m i ) are defined by the sets
where U x is defined the same as in conjunction with Equations (2.11) and (2.12). Plots of the curves defined by the points associated with CBF i , CCBF i , CPF i and CCPF i yield the CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF for the evidence space (X i , X i , m i ) ( Figure 2 ). If the variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x nX have associated evidence spaces (X 1 , X 1 , m 1 ), (X 2 , X 2 , m 2 ), . . . , (X nX , X nX , m nX ), then the vector x ¼ [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x nX ] also has an associated evidence space (X, X, m X ), where (i) X is defined the same as in Equation
The preceding definition for (X, X, m X ) is predicated on the assumption that no restrictions involving possible combinations of values for the x i exist. If such restrictions exist, then the definition of (X, X, m X ) is more complex.
Once the evidence space (X, X, m X ) for x is defined, the plausibility Pl X (U) and belief Bel X (U) for subsets U of X are defined as indicated in Equations (2.20) and (2.21). Further, the relationships indicated in Equations (2.22) -(2.24) also hold. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, (iii) Propagation of the individual values of x contained in X through the function F indicated in Equation (2.1) results in a set Y of possible values for y of the form shown in Equation (2.4). Given that an evidence space (X, X, m X ) exists for x, a resultant evidence space (Y, Y, m Y ) also exists for the values of y. Specifically, (i)
The summation over k in the definition of m Y (U) in Equation (2.30) is necessary to appropriately incorporate the possibility that U ¼ F(V k ) for more than one element V k of X. In turn, the plausibility Pl Y (U) and belief Bel Y (U) for subsets U of Y can be defined as indicated in Equations (2.20) and (2.21); further, the relationships indicated in Equations (2.22) -(2.24) also hold. Provided y is real valued, the evidence space (Y, Y, m Y ) can be summarised by presentation of the corresponding CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF as discussed in conjunction with Equations (2.25) and (2.26). Specifically, the CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF for y are defined by the sets 
where U y is defined the same as in conjunction with Equations (2.15) -(2.18). Plots of the curves defined by the points associated with CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF produce a figure identical in concept to Figure 2 and provide a visual representation of the uncertainty associated with y in terms of belief and plausibility.
Probability theory
Probability theory provides a representation for uncertainty that involves the specification of more structure than evidence theory (Feller 1971 , Fine 1973 , Hacking 1975 , Parry and Winter 1981 , Weatherford 1982 , Stigler 1986 , Apostolakis 1990 , Howson and Urbach 1993 , Billingsley 1995 , Ash and Doléans-Dade 2000 , Kallenberg 2000 , Pollard 2002 . Similarly to evidence theory, probability theory is based on the specification of a triple (X i ,
. . . is a countable sequence of non-intersecting elements of X i ). However, in contrast to an evidence space (X i , X i , m i ), a probability space (X i , X i , p i ) involves the imposition of more structure on X i and p i than is the case for X i and m i for an evidence space. In the terminology of probability theory, (i)X i is the sample space, (ii) the elements of X i are events and collectively constitute what is known as a s-algebra and (iii) p i is a probability measure (Feller 1971) . For notational and computational convenience, a probability space (X i , X i , p i ) is often summarised with a density function d i , where
Unlike possibility theory and evidence theory, which provide two measures of likelihood (i.e. possibility and necessity in possibility theory and plausibility and belief in evidence theory), probability theory provides only one measure of likelihood: probability. The probabilities of a set and its complement are related by
for U [ X i , which is a more restrictive requirement than that shown in Equation (2.8) for possibility and necessity and in Equations (2.23) and (2.24) for belief and plausibility. Convenient graphical summaries of probability spaces are provided by cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) and complementary CDFs (CCDFs). Specifically, the CDF and CCDF for the probability space (X i , X i , p i ) with the corresponding density function d i are defined by the sets
where U x is defined the same as in conjunction with Equations (2.11) and (2.12). Plots of the curves defined by the points associated with CDF i and CCDF i yield the CDF and CCDF for the probability space (X i , X i , p i ) ( Figure 3 ). One interpretation of an evidence space (X, X, m) is that it is a characterisation of a partially defined probability space. In general, there are many possible probability spaces (X, X, p) that are consistent with a given evidence space (X, X, m) in the sense that, if U , X (i.e. technically, an element of the set X associated with (X, X, p)), then BelðUÞ # pðUÞ # PlðUÞ:
ð2:39Þ
As a result of the preceding inequality, if a probability space (X, X, p) is consistent with an evidence space (X, X, m), then the CDF associated with (X, X, p) falls between the CBF and CPF associated with (X, X, m) and similarly the CCDF falls between the CCBF and CCPF. For example, if X corresponds to a bounded interval I ¼ [a, b ] and each focal element U k associated with the evidence space (X, X, m) is a subinterval I k ¼ [a k , b k ] of I, then a probability space (X, X, p) consistent with the evidence space (X, X, m) is defined by the density function
( As a result, the CDF for (X, X, p) falls between the CBF and CPF for (X, X, m), and similarly, the CCDF for (X, X, p) falls between the CCBF and CCPF for (X, X, m) ( Figure 3 ). If the variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x nX have associated probability spaces (X 1 , X 1 , p 1 ), (X 2 , X 2 , p 2 ), . . . , (X nX , X nX , p nX ), then the vector x ¼ [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x nX ] also has an associated probability space (X, X, p X ), where (i) X is defined the same as in Equation (2.3), (ii) X is developed from the sets contained in
and (iii) p X is developed from the properties of p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p nX (Feller 1971) . Specifically, if the x i are independent (i.e. if the occurrence of one x i has no implications for the occurrence of the remaining x j , ji), then for U [ X, where d X ðxÞ ¼ Q nX i¼1 d i ðx i Þ is the density function associated with (X, X, p X ) and d i is the density function associated with (X i , X i , p i ) for i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , nX. The definitions of p X and d X are more complex when x i are not independent and will not be considered here.
Propagation of the individual values of x contained in X through the function F indicated in Equation (2.1) results in a set Y of possible values for y of the form shown in Equation (2.4). Given that a probability space (X, X, p X ) exists for x, a resultant probability space (Y, Y, p Y ) also exists for the values of y. In concept, the probability p Y (U) for a subset U of Y is given by
A formal development of Y and p Y would focus on the properties that F must possess to actually produce the probability space (Y, Y, p Y ) (Feller 1971) ; such details are outside the scope of this presentation. Provided y is real valued, the probability space (Y, Y, p Y ) can be summarised by the presentation of the corresponding CDF and CCDF. Specifically, the CDF and CCDF for y are defined by the sets
where U y is defined the same as in conjunction with Equations (2.15) -(2.18). Plots of the curves defined by the points associated with CDF and CCDF produce a CDF and CCDF identical in concept to the CDF and CCDF in Figure 3 and provide a visual representation of a probabilistic characterisation of the uncertainty associated with y.
Sampling-based uncertainty propagation
An analysis outcome y ¼ F(x) of the form indicated in Equation (2.1) will have an uncertainty structure that derives from the uncertainty structure associated with x.
In particular, the uncertainty associated with y will have an interval representation, a possibility theory representation, an evidence theory representation or a probabilistic representation in consistency with an interval representation (Section 2.1), a possibility theory representation (Section 2.2), an evidence theory representation (Section 2.3) or a probabilistic representation (Section 2.4) for the uncertainty associated with x. An exact determination of the uncertainty structure associated with y without any numerical or approximation error is usually not possible in a real analysis. However, the indicated uncertainty structures for y can be approximated with sampling-based procedures. As indicated by the name, sampling-based (i.e. Monte Carlo) procedures involve the use of a sample
ð2:47Þ from the set X of possible values of x in the estimation of the uncertainty structure associated with y ¼ F(x) that derives from the uncertainty structure associated with x McKay et al. 1979 , Iman 1992 , Barry 1996 , Fishman 1996 , L'Ecuyer 1998 , Joslyn and Helton 2002 , Helton and Davis 2003 , Joslyn and Kreinovich 2005 . For uncertainty propagations involving interval analysis, possibility theory and evidence theory, it is important that the sample provides an 'adequate' coverage of X but there are no requirements for a specific structure for this sample. Of course, what constitutes adequate coverage of X depends on properties of X and the function F(x). In the case of an evidence theory representation of the uncertainty associated with x, adequate coverage of x corresponds to a sample that provides a reasonable estimate of the minimum and maximum values of F(x) for each focal element in the evidence space defined for X. However, for a probabilistic representation of the uncertainty associated with x, the sample in Equation (2.47) must be generated in consistency with the probability distribution defined for x. An exception to this is when importance sampling is used in the propagation of a probabilistic representation of uncertainty; in this situation, a specially selected distribution is used for sampling and the effects of this distribution must then be compensated for to obtain the desired uncertainty propagation (Glynn and Iglehart 1989 , Melchers 1990 , Goyal et al. 1992 , Shahabuddin 1994 , Heidelberger 1995 , Owen and Zhou 2000 , Nicola et al. 2001 .
Once an appropriate sample of the form indicated in Equation (2.47) is generated, an interval representation for the uncertainty associated with y is given by
where Y is the set of possible values for y defined in Equation (2.4) and
It is emphatically emphasised that the preceding procedure will not be the most computationally efficient method for estimating [y mn , y mx ] in many analyses. However, it is presented here for consistency with the sampling-based procedures described below for use in conjunction with possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory representations of the epistemic uncertainty in x and hence in y.
If the epistemic uncertainty associated with x is characterised by a possibility space (X, r X ), then the corresponding possibility space (Y, r Y ) for y can be summarised by its associated CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF (see Equations (2.15) -(2.18)). Specifically, the CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF associated with (Y, r Y ) can be approximated with use of the sample in Equation (2.47) through the relationships where U y denotes a subset of Y of the form defined in conjunction with Equations (2.15) -(2.18). As the sample values for x become increasingly dense in X, the approximations in Equations (2.49) -(2.52) will approach the CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF for y.
If the epistemic uncertainty associated with x is characterised by an evidence space (X, X, m X ), then the corresponding evidence space (Y, Y, m Y ) for y can be summarised by its associated CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF (see Equations (2.31) -(2.34)). Specifically, the CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF associated with (Y, Y, m Y ) can be approximated with use of the sample in Equation (2.47) through the relationships
where U y is defined the same as in Equations (2.49) -(2.52). As the sample values for x become increasingly dense in X and, in particular, approach the values at which F has its minimum and maximum values for the individual focal elements in X, the approximations in Equations (2.53) -(2.56) will approach the CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF for y.
If the epistemic uncertainty associated with x is characterised by a probability space (X, X, p X ), then the corresponding probability space (Y, Y, p Y ) for y can be summarised by its associated CCDF and CDF (see Equations (2.45) and (2.46)). If the sample in Equation (2.47) is generated in consistency with the distribution for x defined by the probability space (X, X, p X ), then the CCDF and CDF associated with (Y, Y, p Y ) can be approximated through the standard sampling-based relationships When appropriately designed, sampling-based uncertainty propagations also provide a mapping between analysis inputs and analysis results that can be explored with a variety of sensitivity analysis procedures (Kleijnen and Helton 1999 , Helton and Davis 2002 , Helton et al. 2006b ).
Aleatory and epistemic uncertainties
The primary focus of this presentation is on the representation of uncertainty in analyses that involve both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. Conceptually, such analyses involve three distinct mathematical entities: (i) a characterisation of aleatory uncertainty; (ii) a function that predicts results of interest; and (iii) a characterisation of epistemic uncertainty , Helton 2003 ). This presentation assumes that probability theory provides the mathematical structure used to represent aleatory uncertainty (Section 2.4). However, four different mathematical structures are considered as alternatives for the representation of epistemic uncertainty: interval analysis (Section 2.1); possibility theory (Section 2.2); evidence theory (Section 2.3); and probability theory (Section 2.4).
The function that predicts results of interest can be represented by
where z is the result of interest, a ¼ [a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a nA ] is the vector of variables included in the analysis that are assumed to be uncertain in an aleatory sense and e M ¼ [e M1 , e M2 , . . . , e M,nM ] is the vector of variables included in the analysis that are involved in the evaluation of the function f and are assumed to be uncertain in an epistemic sense. In addition, there is often epistemic uncertainty with respect to the appropriate values to use for the parameters that define the distributions that characterise the aleatory uncertainty in the elements of a. As a result, there is also a vector e D ¼ [e D1 , e D2 , . . . , e D,nD ] of epistemically uncertain variables used in the definition of the distributions that characterise the aleatory uncertainty associated with the elements of a. Notationally, the distribution for a conditional on a specific realisation for e D can be represented by a density function d A (aje D ). In turn, the vector e ¼ ½e M ; e D ¼ ½e 1 ; e 2 ; . . . ; e nE ð 3:2Þ contains all the epistemically uncertain variables under consideration with nE ¼ nM þ nD.
The uncertainty characterisation associated with each element e i of e starts with a set E i of possible values for e i . In turn, the set of all possible values for e is given by
ð3:3Þ
although in general there can potentially be additional restrictions that limit the possible combinations of values for specific elements of e. What distinguishes the various alternatives for the representation of epistemic uncertainty (e.g. interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory) is the type of internal uncertainty structure imposed on the sets E i and hence on the set E. In practice, this internal uncertainty structure is typically developed through some type of expert review process (Hora and Iman 1989 , Cooke 1991 , Keeney and Winterfeldt 1991 , Meyer and Booker 1991 , Ortiz et al. 1991 , Chhibber et al. 1992 , Thorne and Williams 1992 , Evans et al. 1994 , Budnitz et al. 1998 , McKay and Meyer 2000 , Ayyub 2001 , Cooke and Goossens 2004 , Garthwaite et al. 2005 ). A specific element e ¼ [e M , e D ] of E results in (i) a specific definition for the function f(aje M ) in which e M is fixed and (ii) a specific definition of the density function d A (aje D ), which corresponds to the aleatory distribution for a, in which e D is fixed. Further, associated with the density function d A (aje D ) is a set A of possible values for a. In general, A could be a different set for each possible value of e D ; however, this potential dependency will be suppressed for notational simplicity. Or, equivalently, it can be assumed that d A (aje D ) ¼ 0 for vectors a that are not possible for a given value of e D .
With e ¼ [e M , e D ] fixed as indicated, a single distribution for z results. This distribution is often presented (i) as a CDF defined by the points [z, Prob A ðz # zjeÞ] with to indicate that the probabilities Prob A ðz # zjeÞ and Prob A ðz . zjeÞ are characterising aleatory uncertainty. Similarly, the distribution for z conditional on a specific realisation for e can be represented by a density function d A (zje). Different values for e ¼ [e M , e D ] result in different distributions for z. Thus, as e takes on different values from the set E, a set of epistemically uncertain distributions for z will result ( Figure 5 ). In general, the cardinality (i.e. number of elements) of the resultant set of distributions could, but may not, equal the cardinality of E.
The discussions that follow will focus primarily on the uncertainty structure associated with sets of the form 
Example problem
This presentation employs as an example a coastal dike reliability problem originally introduced by Hussaarts et al. (2000) and subsequently used with modifications by Hall and Lowry (2001) and Ferson and Tucker (2006) . In this problem, the reliability of a dike ( Figure 6) is based on the force balance equation
where (i) D is the relative density of the revetment blocks on the front face of the dike (dimensionless), (ii) D is the thickness of revetment blocks (m), (iii) H is the significant wave height (m), which is the average height of the highest one-third of the waves in a storm event, (iv) a is the slope of the revetment (radians), (v) M is an introduced parameter used to represent model uncertainty (dimensionless) and (vi) s is the offshore peak wave steepness (dimensionless). The dike is assumed to fail if z is negative, which corresponds to a situation in which the force pushing the revetment blocks away from the face of the dike exceeds the force pushing the revetment blocks against the face of the dike (see Section 3, Hussaarts et al. 2000) .
With respect to the definition of z in Equation (4.1), the quantities D, D, a and M are epistemically uncertain quantities related to properties of the dike and H and s are aleatory quantities with distributions that derive in large part from weather variability. The quantities D, D, a and M are assigned the following sets of values in Ferson and Tucker with no specified uncertainty structure within these sets: Further, H and s are assigned probability distributions with epistemically uncertain defining parameters. Specifically, the aleatory uncertainty in H is assumed to be characterised by a Weibull distribution with epistemically uncertain values for the scale factor sc and the shape factor sh and the aleatory uncertainty in s is assumed to be characterised by a normal distribution with epistemically uncertain values for the mean m and the standard deviation s. With respect to the defining parameters for the density function of a Weibull distribution in Section 20.1 of Johnson and Katz (1970) , sc ¼ a, sh ¼ c and d 0 ¼ 0. The quantities sc, sh, m and s are assigned the following sets of possible values in Ferson and Tucker (2006) : As for D, D, a and M, no uncertainty structure was specified within these sets.
It is important to recognise exactly what the distribution assigned to H is characterising. Specifically, this distribution is characterising the year-to-year variability in the maximum annual value for H. Or, put another way, the distribution for H when converted to a CCDF gives the probabilities of H exceeding different values in a single given year. In turn, the distribution for s is for conditions associated with a large value for H (i.e. the maximum value for H in a specific year) but is assumed to be independent of the specific value for this maximum (p. 326, Hussaarts et al. 2000) .
In the context of the notation introduced in Section 3, the function f in Equation (3.1) is given by is a vector of nE ¼ 8 epistemically uncertain variables. As already indicated, the aleatory variables H and s have specified probability distributions with the epistemically uncertain parameters that constitute the elements of e D . The nE ¼ 8 epistemically uncertain variables that constitute the elements of e ¼ [e M , e D ] in Equation (4.9) have ranges (i.e. sets of possible values E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E 8 ) as indicated in Equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.5) and (4.6). However, no uncertainty structure was specified for these ranges in Ferson and Tucker.
The fundamental quantity of interest in this example is the (annual) probability that the dike will fail, which corresponds to the probability that the quantity z in Equation (4.1) is negative. In turn, this probability is given by the integral defining Prob A ðz # 0jeÞ in Equation (3.4) for each possible value of e, and the set of all possible values for this probability is represented by the set Pð0Þ in Equation (3.8). Probabilities Prob A ðz # zjeÞ and sets PðzÞ for other values of z are defined similarly. If desired, probabilities and sets of the form Prob A ðz . zjeÞ and PðzÞ in Equations (3.6) and (3.9) can also be defined.
Unstructured epistemic uncertainty
In the presentation by Ferson and Tucker (2006) , no uncertainty structure is specified for the sets E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E 8 containing the possible values for the nE ¼ 8 epistemically uncertain variables under consideration, which corresponds to an uncertainty specification of the form on which interval analysis (Section 2.1) is predicated. This uncertainty information can also be converted into uncertainty representations of the form used in possibility theory (Section 2.2), evidence theory (Section 2.3) and probability theory (Section 2.4), respectively.
For possibility theory, the resultant distribution function r i for variable e i is given by
For evidence theory, the resultant BPA m i for subsets U of E i is given by
For probability theory, the resultant probability distribution for e i is obtained by recourse to the Laplacian concept of insufficient reason, which asserts that a uniform distribution should be used to characterise epistemic uncertainty when only a set of possible values is specified (pp. 52 -55, Howson and Urbach 1993) . This recourse results in the assignment of the density function
to represent the uncertainty in e i . Collectively, the sets E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E 8 give rise to the set of possible CDFs for z. The set C can be viewed in the context of interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory or probability theory.
In the context of interval analysis, C is the set of possible CDFs associated with the set E of epistemically uncertain variables and nothing more can be said. For possibility theory, there is a possibility space (C, r C ), where
Similarly, for evidence theory, there is an evidence space (C, C, m C ), where C ¼ {C} and for U [ C, where the formal properties of C would follow from the properties of E and p E . An analogous development is also possible for CCDFs and indeed for any property such as an expected value or a quantile that can be extracted from a CDF or a CCDF. However, it is worth noting that the consideration of a particular property extracted from a CDF or a CCDF (e.g. an expected value or a quantile) is equivalent to studying the set of all CDFs or CCDFs with the extracted quantity serving as an index to identify individual CDFs or CCDFs. In this example, the primary quantity of interest is the probability for values less than z ¼ 0. As discussed at the end of Section 4, this set of probabilities is represented by Pð0Þ for z ¼ 0 and by PðzÞ for an arbitrary value of z.
For this example, sampling-based (i.e. Monte Carlo) methods are used to both propagate epistemic uncertainty and integrate over aleatory uncertainty to estimate the CDFs in the set C defined in Equation (5.9) and thus obtain the probabilities in the sets PðzÞ and PðzÞ defined in Equations (3.8) and (3.9). Specifically, a random sample e i ¼ ½e 1i ; e 2i ; . . . ; e 8i ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nSE 1 ; ð5:13Þ of size nSE 1 ¼ 10 4 was generated from E with a uniform distribution assigned to each element of e (i.e. distributions of the form defined in Equation (5.3)). In addition, a sample respectively. The result is nSE ¼ 10,256 CDFs for z and a corresponding number of CCDFs (Figure 7) . For this example, CDFs are more meaningful entities to consider than CCDFs because dike failure is associated with negative values of z and the primary result of interest is how likely z is to be close to or below zero. Therefore, the following discussion will focus on CDFs and the corresponding sets PðzÞ. However, the associated ideas and representations are equally applicable to CCDFs and the corresponding sets PðzÞ. Indeed, in most risk assessments, CCDFs are the primary summary outcomes of interest because they answer the question 'How likely is it to be this large or larger?'
For illustration, this discussion will focus on the set P ¼ Pð0Þ. However, the ideas and associated result structure are the same for PðzÞ with other values of z. The elements (i.e. probabilities) contained in P correspond to the probabilities associated with the vertical line through z ¼ 0 shown in Figure 7 For possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory, the same set P of possible probabilities is under consideration. In concept, possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory result in more internal uncertainty structure within P than is the case for interval analysis. However, in the example of this section, additional uncertainty structure within P only exists for probability theory. A possibility space (P, r P ), an evidence space (P, P, m P ) and a probability space (P, P, p P ) are associated with the set P. In concept, the sampling-based procedures described in Section 2.5 can be used to estimate the CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF for the possibility space (P, r P ), the CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF for the evidence space (P, P, m P ) and the CDF and CCDF for the probability space (P, P, p P ). However, the spaces (P, r P ) and (P, P, m P ) are so simple this is hardly necessary. Specifically, as the possibility space (E, r E ) is degenerate in the sense that r E (e) ¼ 1 for e [ E and the evidence space (E, E, m E ) is degenerate in the sense that m E (E) ¼ 1, it follows immediately that (P, r P ) is degenerate in the sense that r P ( p) ¼ 1 for p [ P and similarly that (P, P, m P ) is degenerate in the sense that m P (P) ¼ 1. As a result, the CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF associated with (P, r P ) and the CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF associated with (P, P, m P ) have simple forms that indicate no uncertainty structure within the set P (Figure 8) . Indeed, in this simple example, interval analysis, possibility theory and evidence theory provide the same information: namely, within the limits of sampling error, the values for are given by
where Pos P denotes the possibility measure associated with the possibility space (P, r P ) and Pl P denotes the plausibility measure associated with the evidence space (P, P, m P ). As a result, plots of Pos P (P p ) and Pl P (P p ) overlay and form the top and left side of the box in Figure 8(a) . Similarly,
where Nec P denotes the necessity measure associated with the possibility space (P, r P ) and Bel P denotes the belief measure associated with the evidence space (P, P, m P ). As a result, plots of Nec P (Pp) and Bel P (Pp) overlay and form the right side and bottom of the 2 1, 1) ; however, it is really the interval [0.0, 0.043] that is of primary interest. Unlike the spaces (P, r P ) and (P, P, m P ), the probability space (P, P, p P ) does involve an uncertainty structure on the set P that derives from the probability space (E, E, p E ) and the associated uniform distributions assigned to the elements of e in Equation (5.3). As indicated in Section 2.5, the sample elements in Equation (5.13) and associated estimates for Prob A ðz # 0je i Þ indicated in Equation (5.19) can be used to estimate the CDF and CCDF for p that derives from the probability space (E, E, p E ) ( Figure 8 ). In this example, the probability space (P, P, p P ) is never fully determined in the sense of giving complete definitions for P and p P ; rather, a sampling-based procedure is used to estimate the associated CDF and CCDF. This approximation is evident as the maximum probability obtained with the random sample of size nSE 1 ¼ 10 4 used in the probabilistic calculation to obtain CDFs and CCDFs is approximately 0.018, whereas the maximum value obtained when the nSE 2 ¼ 256 extreme value combinations of the elements of e are included is approximately 0.043. To obtain probabilities closer to 0.043 in the probabilistic calculation requires either (i) use of a value for nSE 1 that is considerably larger than 10 4 or (ii) use of importance sampling.
In elaboration, the CDF in Figure 8(a) is a plot of the probabilities p P (P p ), and the CCDF in Figure 8(b) is a plot of the probabilities p P P c p
. As most values for p P (P p ) are very close to 1, the resultant CDF is barely discernible in the upper left corner of the box in Figure 8(a) . In contrast, the small values for p P P c p result in a CCDF that is clearly displayed in Figure 8(b) with the log transformation used on the ordinate. In this example, the CCDF rather than the CDF for the probability p that z is less than zero is the quantity of greater relevance because increasing values for p correspond to increasing likelihoods that the system will fail. In concept, and for the same reason, the CCPoF, CCNF, CCPF and CCBF in Figure 8 (b) are also of greater relevance than the CPoF, CNF, CPF and CBF in Figure 8(a) , although, in the current example, these quantities are not very interesting because of their degenerate structure; an example in which the CPoF, CPF, CCPoF and CCPF for p have more structure is presented in the next section (Section 6).
Structured epistemic uncertainty
As illustrated in Section 5, the absence of an internal uncertainty structure for the sets E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E 8 results in analyses based on possibility theory and evidence theory that are effectively identical to results based on interval analysis. Thus, to help differentiate between results obtained with interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory, additional uncertainty structure is now assumed and illustrated for several elements of e. Specifically, additional uncertainty structure is assumed for the sets E 2 , E 4 and E 5 that contain possible values for D, M and sc, respectively.
For convenience, the same uncertainty structure is imposed on E 2 , E 4 and E 5 (i.e. on D, M and sc). For use in describing this structure, I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , I 4 and I 5 denote subintervals (i.e. subsets) of an interval [a, b ] defined by I 1 ¼ ½a; a þ 6ðb 2 aÞ=10; I 2 ¼ ½a þ ðb 2 aÞ=10; a þ 7ðb 2 aÞ=10;
ð6:1Þ
and illustrated in Figure 9 . For this example, it is assumed that each of the indicated subintervals of [a, b ] is equally likely to contain the correct value for the quantity under consideration. Notionally, such a situation could arise from five equally credible experts expressing different intervals of possible values for the quantity under consideration but with no specified internal uncertainty structure for the individual intervals. In turn, the indicated intervals and the assumptions of equal likelihood for the individual intervals can be converted into uncertainty representations in the context of possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory, respectively. For possibility theory, a distribution function r can be defined by where d i (x) is defined in conjunction with Equation (6.2) and L(I i ) is the length of the interval I i .
The sets I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , I 4 and I 5 defined in Equation (6.1) and illustrated in Figure 9 are consistent in the sense that >I i -B. This property is not necessary for the basic probability assignment and density function definitions in Equations (6.3) and (6.4). However, it is necessary for the possibility distribution function defined in Equation (6.2). If the sets I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , I 4 and I 5 were not consistent, then an appropriate normalisation would have to be included in the definition of r(x) in Equation (6.2) [see Equations (6.22) -(6.24) and associated discussion in Helton et al. (2004) ]. Uniform distributions are used in the definitions of the density functions in Equation (6.4). This particular choice of distribution is not necessary for any of the calculations that follow but does affect the values obtained for individual probabilistic results. (e.g. CDFs and CCDFs).
As previously indicated, the same uncertainty structure is being imposed on E 2 , E 4 and E 5 . Specifically, the intervals that correspond to E 2 , E 4 and E 5 (i.e. [0.68, 0.72], [3.0, 5.2] and [1.2, 1.5]) are subdivided as indicated in Equation (6.1) and the resultant uncertainty characterisations for possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory are defined as shown in Equations (6.2), (6.3) and (6.4), respectively. This results in new definitions for (i) r 2 , m 2 and d 2 for D, (ii) r 4 , m 4 and d 4 for M and (iii) r 5 , m 5 and d 5 for sf. In turn, this results in new definitions for the spaces (E, r E ), (E, E, m E ) and (E, E, p E ) introduced in Section 5 and, as a result, also for the corresponding spaces (P, r P ), (P, P, m P ) and (P, P, p P ) with additional internal uncertainty structure imposed on the set P ¼ Pð0Þ. However, the set P itself remains unchanged. Similar expansions also result for the corresponding spaces associated with the sets PðzÞ and PðzÞ.
As indicated in Section 5 and discussed in greater detail in Section 2.5, sampling-based procedures can be used to propagate the uncertainty representations provided by (E, r E ), (E, E, m E ) and (E, E, p E ). For this propagation, a random sample e i ¼ ½e 1i ; e 2i ; . . . ; e 8i ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nSE 1 ; ð6:5Þ of size nSE 1 ¼ 10 4 is again generated from E but now with the redefined distributions for the elements of e (see Equation (6.4)). In addition, a second sample e i ¼ ½e 1i ; e 2i ; . . . ; e 8i ; i ¼ nSE 1 þ 1; nSE 1 þ 2; . . . ; nSE 1 þ nSE 2 ; ð6:6Þ of size nSE 2 ¼ 2 5 10 3 ¼ 32,000 is again generated from E by taking all possible combinations of the endpoints of the focal elements contained in E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E 8 . The purpose of the second sample is to assure coverage of the end points of the focal elements contained in E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E 8 . The result is a sample of size nSE ¼ nSE 1 þ nSE 2 ¼ 42,000 from E. In turn, this results in nSE CDFs and nSE corresponding CCDFs of the form illustrated in Figure 7 and corresponding approximations to the sets PðzÞ and PðzÞ. The sampling-based procedures described in Section 2.5 can be used (i) with the combined sample e i , i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , nSE ¼ nSE 1 þ nSE 2 , to estimate the CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF for the possibility space (P, r P ) and the CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF for the evidence space (P, P, m P ) and (ii) with the random sample e i , i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , nSE 1 , to estimate the CDF and CCDF for the probability space (P, P, p P ) ( Figure 10 ). As interval analysis assumes no uncertainty structure internal to E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E 8 and the set P is unchanged from Section 5, the interval analysis result is still approximated by the interval [0.0, 0.043]. As a result of their increasing levels of uncertainty structure, the uncertainty representations from the possibility space (P, r P ) tend to contain the uncertainty representations from the evidence space (P, P, m P ) (i.e. the CBF and CPF for (P, P, m P ) fall between the CNF and CPoF for (P, r P ) and similarly the CCBF and CCPF fall between the CCNF and CCPoF) and the uncertainty representations from (P, P, m P ) contain the uncertainty representations from the probability space (P, P, p P ) (i.e. the CDF for (P, P, p P ) falls between the CBF and CPF for (P, P, m P ) and similarly the CCDF falls between the CCBF and CCPF).
In elaboration, the results in Figure 10(a) show the changes in the CPoF, CNF, CPF, CBF and CDF in Figure 8 (a) that result when the added uncertainty structure associated with D, M and sc is incorporated into the definitions of the possibility space (P, r P ), the evidence space (P, P, m P ) and the probability space (P, P, p P ). Specifically, the CPoF, CPF and CDF are not substantially changed (actually, the CDF has changed but this change is not apparent at the resolution of Figures 8(a) and 10(a) ). However, the CNF and CBF now display a structure that was completely lacking in Figure 8 Prob A (z ≤ 0 e) 10 -6 10 -5 10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 10 -1 0P rob A (z ≤ 0 e) Figure 10 . Illustration of (i) CNF, CCNF, CPoF and CCPoF for structured possibility space (P, r P ) defined in Section 6 (see Equation (6.2) and resultant definition for r E ), (ii) CBF, CCBF, CPF and CCPF for structured evidence space (P, P, m P ) defined in Section 6 (see Equation (6.3) and resultant definition for m E ) and (iii) CDF and CCDF for non-uniform probability space (P, P, p P ) defined in Section 6 (see Equation (6.4) and resultant definition for density function d E corresponding to p E ): (a) CPoF, CNF, CPF, CBF and CDF with linear scales on abscissa and ordinate, (b) CCPoF, CCNF, CCPF, CCBF and CCDF with linear scales on abscissa and ordinate, (c) same as (b) but with log scale on ordinate and (d) same as (b) but with log scales on abscissa and ordinate. necessity and belief in Figure 8 (a) that p is less than 0.02 are 0; in contrast, the corresponding values shown in Figure 10 (a) are 0.80 and 0.976, respectively. Similarly, the results in Figure 10(b) -(d) show the changes to the CCPoF, CCNF, CCPF, CCBF and CCDF in Figure 8 (b) that result from the changed definitions for (P, r P ), (P, P, m P ) and (P, P, p P ). The results shown in Figure 10 (b) -(d) are the same, but different scalings on the abscissa and ordinate are being used to better display small numerical values. Specifically, linear scales are used on the abscissa and ordinate in Figure 10(b) ; linear and log scales are used on the abscissa and ordinate, respectively, in Figure 10(c) ; and log scales are used on the abscissa and the ordinate in Figure 10(d) . The CCNF and CCBF in Figure 10 (b) -(d) are the same as the CCNF and CCBF shown in Figure 8(b) . However, the CCPoF, CCPF and CCDF are substantially changed. For example, the possibility and plausibility that p is greater than 0.02 are 1.0 in Figure 8 (d) , the probability that p exceeds 0.02 is beneath the numerical resolution of the sample size from E in use (i.e. nSE 1 ¼ 10 4 as indicated in conjunction with Equation (6.5)); estimation of the probability that p exceeds 0.02 in the analyses presented in Figure 8 (b) and 10(b) -(d) would require either a much larger random sample from E or the use of some type of importance sampling procedure. However, as another comparison, the probability that p exceeds 0 is approximately 0.09 in Figure 8 (b) and approximately 0.043 in Figure 10 (b) -(d), with this difference resulting from the changed definitions for the probability space (P, P, p P ).
The uncertainty representations shown in Figure 10 are for the probabilities contained in the set P ¼ Pð0Þ. Analogous representations are also possible for the probabilities contained in the sets PðzÞ and PðzÞ for other values of z and provide a representation of the uncertainty associated with the CDFs and CCDFs shown in Figure 7 . For illustration, the sets PðzÞ are considered. An analogous development is possible, but not shown, for the sets PðzÞ. Let P p ðzÞ denote the set defined by However, the presentation of the preceding representations for multiple values of z is inefficient and unwieldy. A more effective presentation is to display plots of exceedance probabilities that derive from the probability spaces associated with the sets PðzÞ and PðzÞ and analogous quantities that derive from the possibility and evidence spaces associated with PðzÞ and PðzÞ.
For the probability space (E, E, p E ), the resultant probability prob E ½P p ðzÞ is a non-increasing function of p because P v ðzÞ # P u ðzÞ for 0 # u # v # 1. As a result, the value Prb q (z) associated with exceedance probability q (e.g. q ¼ 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9) for the set PðzÞ can be informally defined as the element of p of PðzÞ for which the approximate equality With Pð0Þ used as an example, the preceding corresponds graphically to (i) starting at the value q on the ordinate of Figure 10(d) (or, equivalently, Figure 10 (b) or 10(c)), (ii) drawing a horizontal line to the CCDF and then (iii) drawing a vertical line down to the abscissa to determine the value of p ¼ Prob A ðz # 0jeÞ corresponding to the value Prb q (0) associated with exceedance probability q.
In words, there is an epistemic (i.e. degree of belief) probability q (e.g. q ¼ 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9) that the value for an element p of PðzÞ is larger than Prb q (z). More specifically, this implies a probability of q that the correct value for Prob A ðz ¼ zÞ is greater than or equal to Prb q (z). In turn, the epistemic uncertainty associated with the set C of CDFs defined in Equation (5.9) and illustrated in Figure 7 (a) can be summarised with plots of the exceedance probability curves defined by [z, Prb q (z)] for z mn # z # z mx and selected values of q (e.g. for q ¼ 0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 1.0 as illustrated in Figure 11 ).
For the possibility space (E, r E ), the quantities Pos q (z) and Nec q (z) for the set PðzÞ are defined by respectively. The quantities Pos q (z) and Nec q (z) are analogous to Prb q (z) and are amenable to similar intuitive descriptions except that they correspond to values of p with an exceedance possibility and an exceedance necessity of q rather than a value of p with an exceedance probability of value q. In turn, the epistemic uncertainty associated with the set C of CDFs defined in Equation (5.9) can be summarised with plots of the possibility curves and necessity curves defined by [z, Pos q (z)] and [z, Nec q (z)], respectively, for z mn # z # z mx and selected values of q (Figure 12) . Values for q are given a step size of 0.2 in Figure 12 because of the discretised nature of possibility and necessity in this example. respectively. The quantities Pl q (z) and Bel q (z) are analogous to Prb q (z), Pos q (z) and Nec q (z) and are amenable to similar intuitive descriptions except that they correspond to values of p with an exceedance plausibility and an exceedance belief of q rather than values of p with an exceedance probability, an exceedance possibility and an exceedance necessity of q. As shown in Figures 11 and 12 for Prb q (z), Pos q (z) and Nec q (z), the epistemic uncertainty associated with the set C of CDFs defined in Equation (5.9) can be summarised with plots of the plausibility curves and belief curves defined by [z, Pl q (z)] and [z, Bel q (z)], respectively, for z mn # z # z mx and selected values of q ( Figure 13 ). For interval analysis, there is no internal uncertainty structure associated with the set C of CDFs. Thus, all that can be said is that the elements of C fall between the bounding (i.e. extreme) CDFs indicated in Figure 7 . 
Summary discussion
The appropriate incorporation and representation of the effects and implications of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty are fundamental parts of modern performance and risk studies. Traditionally, probability theory has provided the mathematical structure used to characterise both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. For example, probability is used to characterise aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's reassessment of the risks posed by commercial nuclear power stations (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) 1990 , Breeding et al. 1992 , Helton and Breeding 1993 and in the US Department of Energy's successful compliance certification application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (US Department of Energy (US DOE) 1996, Helton et al. 2000) . With this approach to the representation of uncertainty, aleatory uncertainty in analysis outcomes of interest is typically represented with CDFs or CCDFs and, in turn, epistemic uncertainty leads to distributions of these curves. Specifically, the outcome is a probabilistic characterisation of the epistemic uncertainty associated with families of CDFs and CCDFs, which in turn are probabilistic characterisations of aleatory uncertainty (Kaplan and Garrick 1981 , Helton 1996 .
In the last several decades, a number of alternatives to probability theory for the representation of epistemic uncertainty have been proposed, including interval analysis, possibility theory and evidence theory. These alternatives permit a less detailed representation of epistemic uncertainty than is possible with probability theory. As a result, these alternatives may more appropriately characterise epistemic uncertainty in the presence of limited information than probability theory. In particular, the use of probability to characterise epistemic uncertainty in the presence of limited information can imply the presence of more knowledge than is actually present.
This presentation illustrates the use of interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory in the representation of the epistemic uncertainty associated with CDFs and CCDFs that summarise the effects of aleatory uncertainty. As the presented examples show, the resultant representation of epistemic uncertainty and the associated implications of this uncertainty can be very different depending on the mathematical structure used to characterise epistemic uncertainty in analysis inputs. Although possibility theory, evidence theory and probability theory provide different mathematical structures for the representation of epistemic uncertainty, the uncertainty results that derive from these different structures can be summarised in conceptually similar formats. Specifically, cumulative and complementary cumulative uncertainty representations are possible for each of these theories. With this format, the outcomes of an uncertainty analysis based on possibility theory can be represented with CNFs, CCNFs, CPoFs and CCPoFs; the outcomes of an uncertainty analysis based on evidence theory can be represented with CBFs, CCBFs, CPFs and CCPFs; and, as is usually done, the outcomes of an uncertainty analysis based on probability theory can be represented with CDFs and CCDFs. Cumulative and complementary cumulative uncertainty representations provide compact and informative summaries of uncertainty information. Further, as illustrated in this presentation, cumulative and complementary cumulative uncertainty representations provide a common format that can be used to compare uncertainty results obtained when different mathematical structures are used to characterise epistemic uncertainty.
Possibility theory and evidence theory provide uncertainty representations with less internal structure than probability theory. However, the propagation of these representations through a model to obtain the resultant uncertainty representations for model results can require more computation (i.e. model evaluations) than is the case when probability is used to represent uncertainty. This computational requirement results when a large number of discontinuities are present in a possibility or evidence theory representation for epistemic uncertainty. For example, an evidence theory representation for uncertainty can rapidly expand to involve a huge number of focal elements as the number of uncertain variables increases (e.g. an evidence space constructed from 10 uncertain variables with 10 focal elements for each variable has 10 10 focal elements). This presentation has used a computationally simple model for illustration. As a result, large numbers of model evaluations were possible.
In most real analyses, this level of naïve computation is unlikely to be possible. Rather, some type of efficient computational strategy will have to be developed to support the large number of model evaluations required to propagate uncertainty representations based on possibility theory or evidence theory. For example, sensitivity analysis procedures can be used to identify the variables that dominate the uncertainty in analysis results of interest (Helton 1993 , Hamby 1994 , Kleijnen and Helton 1999 , Saltelli et al. 2000 , Frey and Patil 2002 , Helton and Davis 2002 , Helton et al. 2006b ). Then, only these important variables can be included in the uncertainty propagation. This reduces the dimensionality of the input space and, as a result, can significantly reduce the number of model evaluations required in an uncertainty propagation. A related approach is to perform a stepwise uncertainty propagation in which the full uncertainty representation is used for the most important input variable, and all other variables are assigned degenerate representations; the analysis is then repeated with the full uncertainty representation used for the two most important variables and all other variables assigned degenerate uncertainty representations; this process then continues until the inclusion of full uncertainty representations for additional variables results in no significant changes in the uncertainty representations for analysis results of interest, with the analysis stopping at this point (Helton et al. 2007 ). Again, this approach reduces the dimensionality of the input space and, as a result, can significantly reduce the number of model evaluations required in an uncertainty propagation. Computational savings can also be achieved by reducing the complexity of the uncertainty representations in use (e.g. by replacing an evidence space with many focal elements with a related evidence space with fewer focal elements) (Helton et al. 2007 ). Again, this results in computational savings by reducing the complexity of the input space. Finally, significant computational savings can be achieved by using non-parametric regression techniques and other related procedures to develop computationally efficient approximations to numerically demanding models (Hastie and Tibshirani 1990 , Friedman 1991 , Chaudhuri et al. 1994 , Simonoff 1996 , Bowman and Azzalini 1997 , Ruppert et al. 2003 , Kennedy et al. 2006 , O'Hagan 2006 , Storlie and Helton 2008a .
The results of performance and risk analyses for complex systems are usually presented as CDFs and CCDFs that summarise the effects of aleatory uncertainty. In turn, the presence of epistemic uncertainty results in many possible values for these CDFs and CCDFs. If possibility theory and evidence theory are to have a role in characterising epistemic uncertainty in the results of such analyses, these theories must be able to provide uncertainty characterisations for sets of epistemically uncertain CDFs and CCDFs. As illustrated in this presentation, such characterisations can be obtained with possibility and evidence theories.
However, three challenges remain to the use of possibility theory and evidence theory in performance and risk analyses for complex systems. First, it is necessary to convince the supporters (i.e. funders) of these analyses of the appropriateness and value of the use of an alternative to probability for the representation of epistemic uncertainty. This is likely to involve a large educational effort as few funders or users of such analyses will be familiar with these alternatives to probability for the representation of epistemic uncertainty. Second, most analysts who participate in analyses of this type will not be familiar with these alternative uncertainty representations. Again, a significant educational effort is likely to be necessary before the desired uncertainty representations for analysis inputs can be obtained. Third, computationally practicable methods must be developed and implemented for the propagation of the uncertainty representations through the analysis. This development and implementation are likely to be analysis specific.
Plant and the proposed repository for high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration's Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative and Advanced Simulation and Computing programmes to develop advanced computing capabilities. He has extensive journal and national laboratory publications and is on the editorial board of Reliability Engineering System Safety. He received his BS degree in 1967 from Southwest Texas State College, his MA degree in 1968 from the University of Texas at Austin, and his PhD degree in 1970 from the University of Texas at Austin; all degrees are in mathematics.
Mr. Johnson has 30 years of experience in developing sensitivity, uncertainty and graphics models relating to probabilistic risk analysis telemetry analysis and physical process simulations for commercial nuclear reactors and geological nuclear waste repositories. He received his BS degree in Ceramic Engineering from Iowa State University in 1976 and his MS degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of New Mexico in 1979. Cédric Sallaberry is a member of the Technical Staff at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), where he has worked since in 2003 on the development of the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain (YM), Nevada, for the geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste. His responsibilities in this project have included the development of a new probabilistic framework separating aleatory and epistemic uncertainty for the Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) supporting the licence application for the YM repository. He has also performed sensitivity and uncertainty analyses on doses and intermediate results obtained as part of the TSPA. His current responsibilities include providing mathematical and statistical expertise and support in uncertainty and sensitivity analyses. Prior to joining SNL, Dr Sallaberry worked 2 years in a post doctoral position for the French Radwaste Disposal Agency (ANDRA), where he was involved in the development and implementation of a probabilistic framework for the deterministic performance assessment then in use by ANDRA. He received his BS degree in 1994, his MS degree in 1996 and his PhD in 2001, all in applied mathematics, from the University of Bordeaux I.
